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Abstract
In the present paper I argue that the formalism of Newtonian me-
chanics stems directly from the general principle to be called the princi-
ple of microlevel reducibility which physical systems obey in the realm
of classical physics. This principle assumes, first, that all the prop-
erties of physical systems must be determined by their states at the
current moment of time, in a slogan form it is “only the present mat-
ters to physics.” Second, it postulates that any physical system is
nothing but an ensemble of structureless particles arranged in some
whose interaction obeys the superposition principle. I substantiate this
statement and demonstrate directly how the formalism of differential
equations, the notion of forces in Newtonian mechanics, the concept of
phase space and initial conditions, the principle of least actions, etc.
result from the principle of microlevel reducibility. The philosophical
concept of thick presentism and the introduction of two dimensional
time—physical time and meta-time that are mutually independent on
infinitesimal scales—are the the pivot points in these constructions.
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1 Principle of microlevel reducibility
Dealing with objects of the inanimate world in the frameworks of classical
physics, we admit the existence of the microscopic (elementary) level of their
description. It means that in modeling such physical systems one can make
use of the following premises to be referred further as to the principle of
microlevel reducibility.1
1. For any physical system there can be found a level of its microlevel
description at which the system at hand is composed of individual
structureless entities. The term ‘structureless’ is used to emphasize the
fact that either these entities are really structureless or their internal
structure does not change in time during analyzed phenomena and so
can be treated as a fixed characteristic of the entities.
2. All the properties exhibited by the given system can be explained
based on or derived from
(a) the individual properties of these entities which (properties) exist
independently of the presence of the other entities,
(b) the properties of pairwise interaction between entities meeting
the superposition principle.
Further these structureless entities will be called particles for short.
Premise 2b may be replaced by another one using the concept of fields.
Namely, instead of a long-distance interaction of particles a certain field, for
example, electromagnetic field is introduced. This field is locally generated
1The two premises may be regarded as a particular version of reductionism, a philo-
sophical concept about the relationship between complex systems as whole entities and
their constituent parts. In actual fact the concept of reductionism is more complicated
and contradictory, for example, there are various versions of reductionism deserving an
individual consideration. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the principle of microlevel
reducibility may be treated as one of the cornerstones in the research paradigm of physics,
namely, it is a particular implementation of the general scientific methods based on de-
composition analysis and synthesis (see, e.g., Beaney, 2015).
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by particles, propagates in space, and, in turn, affects them. In these terms
Premise 2b is read as
2. All the properties exhibited by the given system can be explained
based on or derived from the individual properties of its constituent
structureless particles (item 2a) and
(b′) the own properties of some fields freely propagating through space
as well as the properties of the local particle-field interaction
obeying the superposition principle and being responsible for the
field generation by the particles and in turn the effects produced
by these fields on the particles.
It should be noted that the concept of particle interaction based on Premise 2b′
is much reacher in properties and potentiality in describing complex systems
in comparison with that based on Premise 2b. However, if the dynamics of
a certain system is characterized by time scales much longer then the mean
time during which the corresponding fields propagate in space over distances
about the system size, Premise 2b′ is approximately reduced to Premise 2b.
It will be used, for the sake of simplicity, in the following sections, although
the results to be obtained can be generalized to theories turning directly to
Premise 2b′. Besides, strictly speaking, the use of the fields leads to the
necessity of modifying Premise 1 too because in this case a given physical
system is decomposed not only into structureless particles but also fields
existing on their own and which have to be treated as its constituent enti-
ties. However various aspects of these fields regarded as individual objects
on their own, i.e., beyond the scope of the interaction between the particles
that is implemented via these fields, do not belong to the subject-matter of
this paper.
The following two comments are also worthy of noting before passing
directly to various consequences of the principle of microlevel reducibility.
First, Premise 2a concerns the properties that are ascribed to particles indi-
vidually, i.e. independently of the presence or absence of other particles. In
this sentence by the term “properties” I actually mean a certain collection
of types of properties ascribed to the particles individually. For example,
“being located at a spatial point” is a property type of point-like particles
in classical physics, it characterizes a generic feature of all these objects.
“Being able to restore its previous form once the forces are no longer ap-
plied” exemplifies another generic property which as a type is ascribed to
all elastic springs. I noted this fact here to emphasize that particular in-
stantiations of these properties, their tokens, can depend on the presence
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of other particles. For example, if a point-like particle A occupies a spatial
point r then another similar particle B cannot be located at this point. Fer-
roelectricity also exemplifies this feature; in some crystals particular elastic
deformation of the crystalline lattice inside a small region can be sustained
by similar deformations in other regions via the formation of macroscopic
electric field, giving rise to some specific deformation of the crystal as a
whole. The difference and relationship between types and their tokens2 is
essential for elucidating the basic features of the general scientific methods
based on decomposition analysis and synthesis (see, e.g., Beaney, 2015). At
the first step, the individual generic properties of physical particles can be
studied dealing with one of them taken separately from the others. After
that, at the second step, the complex behavior of ensembles of these parti-
cles can be reconstructed based on the found properties and the interaction
between the particles which is specified by their spatial arrangement and
the particular instantiations of their individual properties.
The second comment concerns the implementation of this step in recon-
structing the behavior of many particle ensembles. In order to do this we
need to know how to specify the interaction between the particles. Following
the decomposition strategy it could be reasonable to analyze this interaction
for a pair of these particles or, at least, a system consisting of a few particles
taken separately. In this way, however, we face up to a challenging problem
of how the results to be bound can be generalized to the original many par-
ticle ensemble. It is solved within the framework of Premise 2b appealing to
the superposition principle. This principle postulates that the interaction
of an arbitrary chosen particle and all the other particles forming a certain
ensemble, for example, the cumulative force with which the other particles
act on the given one is just the algebraic sum of all the partial forces that
can be found in the following way. We should consider a pair of the chosen
particle and any one of the other particles assuming the remaining particles
of this ensemble to be absent. Then the corresponding partial force is just
the force with the second particle of the given pair would act on the first one
in this case. In particular, the superposition principle allows us to reduce
the interaction energy of a many particle ensemble to the sum of the ener-
gies of pair-wise interaction between individual pairs of its particles running
over all the possible pairs in this ensemble. Finally, I want to note that
Premise 2b can be easily generalized to including also plausible three-body
forces.
2A detailed discussion about the distinction between a type and its token in various
aspects can be found, e.g., in the review by Wetzel (2014).
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In the next sections I present some arguments about why Newtonian
mechanics is based on the mathematical formalism of second order differ-
ential equations. At the first step appealing to the principle of microlevel
reducibility let us try to elucidate what general mathematical form the laws
governing the dynamics of physical systems should have within the frame-
work of classical physics.
2 Presentism and the time flow
The possibility of reducing a description of a physical system to structure-
less particles and interaction between them has an important consequence.
These particles cannot remember their history or foresee their future; they
just have no means to do this, so only the present matters to them. There-
fore all the plausible quantities {Q}α that can be used to describe the laws
governing the motion of a given particle α have to be taken at the current
moment of time. Naturally there should be other characteristics of the par-
ticles such as mass, charge, spin magnitude, etc. which, however, are treated
as their internal properties not changing in time. Let us regard the dynam-
ics of these particles as their motion in a certain N -dimensional space RN ;
for our world treated in the realm of classical physics N = 3. So the spatial
position (spatial coordinates) xα of the particle α has to enter the collection
{Q}α. The motion of this particle is represented by the time dependence
xα(t) of its position showing the points occupied previously and the points
to be got in future according to prediction of its dynamics. However, for
such particles
• the past no longer exists,
• the future does not exist yet,
• only the present matters to them and determines everything.
Thereby solely instantaneous characteristics of the particle motion trajec-
tory {xα(t)} may also enter the collection {Q}α. They are time derivatives
of xα(t) taken at the current moment of time t. In particular, it is the parti-
cle velocity vα(t) = dxα(t)/dt, its acceleration aα(t) = d
2xα(t)/dt
2, the time
derivative of third order called usually the jerk or jolt jα(t) = d
3xα(t)/dt
3,
and so on. However, in order to construct a time derivative we have to con-
sider not only the current position xα(t) of a particle but also its position
xα(t−∆) in the immediate past separated from the present by an infinitely
short time interval ∆ → +0. Indeed, for example, the particle velocity is
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defined as vα(t) = lim∆→+0[xα(t) − xα(t −∆)]/∆. At this place an atten-
tive reader may find some contradiction, in speaking about the present we
actually deal with a certain kind of instants including not only the point-
like current moment of time but also other time moments belonging to some
neighborhood of the current time whose size may be an infinitely small value.
It causes us to speak about the thick present.
The concept of thick present is worthy of special attention because it
leads directly to the formalism of differential equations and the principle of
least action playing a crucial role in modern physics. Therefore let us focus
out attention on the philosophical doctrine usually referred to as presentism
which can be employed to penetrate deeper into the concept of thick present.
Broadly speaking, presentism is the thesis that only the present exists. In
the given form it is a rather contradictory and ambiguous proposition being
one of the subjects of ongoing debates about the nature of time tracing
their roots in ancient Greece. In particular, the problems of presentism are
met in the famous paradoxes of motion (see, e.g., Huggett, 2010) devised
by the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (circ. 490–430 BC). Unfortunately,
none of Zeno’s works has survived and what we know about his paradoxes
comes to us indirectly, through paraphrases of them and comments on them,
primarily by Aristotle (384–322 BC), however, by Plato (428/427–348/347
BC), Proclus (circ. 410–485 AD), and Simplicius (circ. 490–560 AD) saved
them for us. The names of the paradoxes were created by commentators,
not by Zeno (Dowden, 2016).
We confine ourselves to the arrow paradox primarily mentioned in the
context of the time problem. This paradox is designed to prove formally
that the flying arrow cannot move, it has to be at the rest and, so, the
motion is merely an illusion. Citing Aristotle’s Physics VI,
[t]he third is . . . that the flying arrow is at rest, which result follows
from the assumption that time is composed of moments . . . . He says
that if everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that
which is in locomotion is always occupying such a space at any moment,
the flying arrow is therefore motionless.
Focusing our attention on the issue in question I want to interpret the arrow
paradox as three logical steps:
• time is composed of instants—point-like moments of time—and the
present is the current moment;
• only the present matters, i.e., all the properties of the flying arrow
including its motion at a certain velocity are determined completely
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by its current state, i.e., the spatial point where it is currently located;
• whence it follows that the arrow motion is impossible because the state
of any arrow—flying from the left to the right, in the opposite direc-
tion, or just being at the rest—is the same if at the current moment
of time it is located at the same spatial point; the arrow just does not
“know” in which direction it has to move.
Aristotle was the first who proposed, in his book Physics VI (Chap. 5,
239b5–32), a certain solution to the arrow paradox. Since that time this
paradox having been attacked from various points of view (see, e.g., reviews
by Lepoidevin, 2002; Huggett, 2010; Dowden, 2016), a detailed analysis of
Aristotle’s solution and its modern interpretation can be found in works by
Vlastos (1966); Lear (1981); Magidor (2008).
A na¨ıve solution to the arrow paradox could be the proposal to include
the instantaneous velocity in the list of basic properties characterizing the
current arrow state. Unfortunately the instantaneous velocity, as well as the
rate of time changes in any quantity, cannot be attributed to an instant—
a point-like moment of time. The velocity is a characteristic of a certain,
maybe, infinitesimal neighborhood of this time moment (Arntzenius, 2000).
For this reason Russell (1903;1937) rejects the instantaneous velocity at a
given moment to be the body’s intrinsic property having some causal power.
Arguments for and against this view have been analyzed, e.g., by Arntzenius
(2000); Lange (2005).
As a plausible way to overcoming this causation problem of instanta-
neous velocity, a special version of presentism admits the present to have
some duration (e.g., Craig, 2000; Dainton, 2010; McKinnon, 2003). Follow-
ing Hestevold (2008) it is called thick presentism. On the contrast, thin
presentism takes the present to be durationless, which, however, immedi-
ately gives rise to logical puzzles like Zeno’s arrow.
In the framework of thick presentism there has been put forward a rather
promising solution to the arrow paradox turning to the formalism of nonstan-
dard analysis; for an introduction to this discipline a reader may be referred
to Goldblatt (1998). Following (White, 1982; McLaughlin and Miller, 1992;
McLaughlin, 1994; Arntzenius, 2000; Easwaran, 2014; Reeder, 2015) let us
equip each point-like time moment t with some neighborhood of infinitesi-
mal thickness 2, i.e., t → t = (t − , t + ) and understand time events as
some objects distributed inside t. Here  is an infinitesimal—infinitely small
hyperreal number of nonstandard analysis. Below I will use the term bold
instants in order to address to such objects and not to mix them with times
intervals of finite thickness also conceded in some particular versions of thick
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presentism. It is worthy of noting that there is no contradiction between
the notion of bold instants and the intuitive separability of time moments
because for any two moments t1 and t2 separated by arbitrary small but
finite interval the infinitesimal regions t1 and t2 do not overlap.
The notion of bold instants t opens, in particular, a gate to endowing
the instant velocity with causal power just attributing the instant velocity
to the left part (t− , t) of t and assuming that its effect arises in the right
part (t, t + ) (Easwaran, 2014, a similar view was also defended by Lange
(2002)). In this case, as it must, a cause and its effect are ordered in time;
a cause precedes its effect.
Introducing the concept of bold instants we have to accept a special
topological connectedness of time which is non-local on infinitesimal scales.
Namely, for a time moment t at least all the previous time moments in the
infinitesimal interval (t − , t) are to coexist, otherwise they cannot have
causal power on it. Exactly this connectedness paves the way for properties
that can be attributed only to time intervals including infinitesimals to have
causal power (Lange, 2002, 2005; Harrington, 2011). Allowing the given
multitude of time moments to exist we actually accept a special version of
thick presentism called the degree presentism proposed by Smith (2002).
His account assumes that all events have past and future parts whose exis-
tence degree (degree of reality) decreases to zero as their time moments go
away from the present. Baron (2015b) has developed a related account of
time called priority presentism according to which only the present entities
exist fundamentally, whereas the past and future entities also existing are
grounded in the present.
Any version of presentism has to explain how the flow of time is im-
plemented in dynamical phenomena. In the framework of thick presentism
Baron (2012) puts forward the step-wise model for the flow of time consisting
in temporally extended (thick) instants. Each of these instants comes into
and going our of existence in such a manner that successive thick instants
partially overlap.
At the next step in describing dynamical processes in terms of thick
presentism we face up to a problem of giving the meaning to time changes
in the properties of some object for which its present partially contains
its past and future parts. As a natural way to overcoming this problem,
Smart (1949) introduces a complex structure of time containing in addition
to the physical time a certain meta-time. Meta-time is necessary to deal
with temporal properties of events embedded into the “river of time” when
these properties themselves change in time and a meta-time is a place where
these changes can occur. It should be emphasized that the introduction of
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Figure 1: Illustration of a plausible mechanism synchronizing the time flows
in the subjective and objective components of human nature.
two-dimensional time for thick presentism with bold instants does not lead
to paradoxes arising in the time travel problem and used often as arguments
against the possibility of two-dimensional time structure. A review of these
arguments is given, e.g., by Richmond (2000); Oppy (2004); Baron (2015a).
The matter is that the difference between the physical time and meta-time
becomes essential only within bold instants—the infinitesimal intervals—
wherein time travels with non-zero length quantified by standard numbers
are impossible.
Below I will outline my account of dynamical processes consisting in
bold instants which is developed for explaining the use of differential equa-
tions for modeling dynamical phenomena in classical mechanics and the
variational technique as a fundamental law governing dynamics of physical
object. Before this, however, let me elucidate the further constructions using
the relationship of human and physical time as a characteristic example.
As noted previously (Lubashevsky and Plawinska, 2009), two compo-
nents of human nature, objective and subjective ones (Fig. 1) should be
discriminated in modeling human behavior. The objective component rep-
resents the world external for a given individual and embedded in the flow of
the physical time. The subjective component representing the internal world
of this individual is equipped with a more complex structure of time to be
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referred as to human time. It consists of the past retained in the memory,
the imaginary future, and the complex (specious) present comprising all the
moments of the physical time perceived by the individual as simultaneous.
Because the past and future in human mind can affect our current actions
we have to regard them as real objects existing in the subjective component.
A detail discussion of these temporal components requires immersion in the
modern theory of time which is beyond the capacity of the given paper, so
for a review a reader may be referred, e.g., to articles by Markosian (2014);
Hawley (2010) and paper-collections edited by Callender (2011); Ciuni et al.
(2013). Here we touch only the problem how these time components are re-
lated to each other, moreover, confine ourselves to the nearest past, the
complex present, and the forthcoming future.
Generally speaking we may say that the complex present in the human
time is synchronized with the present in the physical time via the direct
interaction of the given individual with the reality. However this synchro-
nization is not an one-to-one map. In fact, the complex present may be
conceived of as a certain interval Tt with fuzzy boundaries containing the
current moment t of the physical time. Its any point t′ is perceived by the
individual as the present in the human time with some degree Φ(t − t′)
decreasing to zero as the time gap |t − t′| increases and exceeds the char-
acteristic duration ∆ of the complex present. It is necessary to emphasize
that on scales about ∆ the order of time moments in the physical time is not
recognized by the given individual and so does not exist in the subjective
component.
As far as the nearest past in the subjective component is concerned, it
may be regarded as fixed. On the contrast, the forthcoming imaginary future
permanently changes as its time moments t′ come closer to the present,
t′ → Tt, and becomes the fixed reality when the point t′ goes into Tt. It
is a result of permanent correction of the imaginary future based on the
interaction between the individual and the reality.
The given example prompts me to put forward the following model of
the time flow consisting in bold instants applied to describing dynamics of
a certain physical system.
3 Thick presentism with moving window of exis-
tence
The non-stand analyses enables us to operate with infinitely small and in-
finitely large numbers in addition to standard ones. The set of these numbers
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Figure 2: Illustration of thick presentism with moving window of existence:
(left) two-dimensional time structure and (right) the realization dynamics
of some physical system.
forms a field, i.e., all the arithmetics operations (addition, subtraction, mul-
tiplication, and devision), relations, and, thus, many mathematical functions
are defined in it (for an introductin see, e.g., Goldblatt, 1998). It allows us
to deal with infinitesimal bold instants as ordinary intervals.
Using infinitesimals we can introduce a certain function Φ(|t′ − T |/)
giving us the degree of existence for the events coming into being at a time
moment t′. Here  is the infinitesimal thickness of the bold instant t centered
at T and Φ(|t′ − T |/) → 0 as the ratio |t′ − T |/ → ∞. The function
Φ(|t′ − T |/) admits the interpretation as a certain characteristic function
of the window of existence with fuzzy boundaries which is attributed to the
bold instant t. This window moves along the axis of the physical time due to
the flow of time. Actually these constructions introduce a two dimensional
(2D) time structure containing the meta-time governing the realization of
physical systems on the corresponding time-space manifold (Fig. 2).
Having introduced the bold instants—time intervals even if they are of
infinitesimal thickness—as the basic elements of time flow we have to modify
the standard way of describing the dynamics of a certain system in the space
RN . Within the standard description the system is specified by the point-
like position x(t) it occupies at the current moment of time t. As time
grows the generated trajectory represents the system motion. In the realm
of thick presentism we should ascribe a certain degree of existence not only
to the point-like object x(t) but also to the trajectory fragments {x(t)}t,
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where t ∈ t. It means that the very basic level of the system description
must consist in the trajectories, at least, their parts rather than point-like
objects and causal power may be attributed only to these basic elements.
We should to do this at each moment T of meta-time, otherwise, evolution
and emergence as dynamical phenomena are merely a mirage—everything is
fixed beforehand. In other words, the basic element of the system description
in the 2D-time structure is given by the trajectory {x(t, T )} or, speaking
more strictly, its partition specified by bold instants t. I have used the term
trajectory to emphasize that these basic elements are certain functions of
the argument t running from −∞ to +∞ rather than points of the space
RN ; here the meta-time T plays the role of a parameter.
In these terms the system dynamics at any moment T of meta-time is
characterized by the following components:
• the past of the system: {x(t, T )} matching t < T and t /∈ tT ,
• the thick present of the system: {x(t, T )} where t ∈ tT ,
• the future of the system: {x(t, T )} matching t > T and t /∈ tT
depending on T . It is worthy of noting that involving the past and further
into consideration of causal processes affecting the system dynamics does
not contradict the previous statement about their absence for structureless
particles of classical physics. Such particles have no means to remember
individually their past or to predict their future. However in the case under
consideration the causal power of the past and future is due to the physical
properties of the time flow itself rather than that of the particles and spends
over temporal intervals of infinitesimal thickness only.
In the framework of thick presentism all the properties of the given sys-
tem at the current moment T of meta-time must be determined completely
by the trajectory {x(t, T )}, whereas the presence of its points in the reality is
determined by the current position of the window of existence. It concerns
also the property I call the sensitivity of the given system to the flow of
meta-time or simply meta-time sensitivity. It quantifies the variation of the
trajectory {x(t, T )} caused by the meta-time flow provided the correspond-
ing part of the trajectory is present in the reality. The partial existence of
a trajectory fragment in the reality decreases its variation so the governing
equation for these trajectory variations can be written as
∂x(t, T )
∂T
= P
( |t− T |

)
Ω̂ [{x(t, T )}] , (1)
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Figure 3: Typical forms of kernels determining nonlocal contribution of
different time moments to the system meta-time sensitivity.
where the operator Ω̂ [{x(t, T )}] specifies the meta-time sensitivity of the
given system with the trajectory {x(t, T )}. Figure 2 (right fragment) illus-
trates the variations of the system trajectory as the meta-time grows. It
should be noted that within the bold instant tT the time moments may not
be ordered in their effects, i.e., the variation of the system trajectory at
moment t ∈ tT can be partially caused by time moments preceding as well
as succeeding it. In the latter case we can speak about backward causation
(for a general discussion on the backward causation problem a reader may
be referred to Faye, 2010).
Equation (1) can relate to one another only the trajectory fragments
corresponding to bold instants t that either contain the time moment T or
are distant from it over scales about . So terms similar to
+∞∫
−∞
dt′Ki
(
t− t′

)
x(t′, T ) (2)
should mainly contribute to the variation of the trajectory {x(t, T )} at the
point t ∈ tT and the typical forms of the kernels Ki (. . .) are exemplified in
Fig. 3. Such nonlocal effects can connect only time moments separated by
infinitely small time lags whereas the motion trajectory of systems at hand
are to be smooth curves. In this case the nonlocal operator Ω̂ [{x(t, T )}]
should reduce to a certain local function ω whose arguments are the current
system position x and its various derivatives taken at the current moment t
Ω̂ [{x(t, T )}] =⇒ ω
[
x(t, T ),
∂x(t, T )
∂t
,
∂2x(t, T )
∂t2
,
∂3x(t, T )
∂t3
, . . .
]
. (3)
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The possible forms of this function and the corresponding consequences will
be discussed in the following two sections. In the remaining part of this
section I will explain the mechanism via which steady-state laws governing
system dynamics can emerge in the realm of thick presentism.
The window of existence moves from past to future along both the time-
axes and never returns to instants already passed. So in the realm of thick
presentism the past of a given system cannot change as the meta-time grows,
which stems directly from equation (1). However it does not mean that the
future has no influence on the past. In the general case the past is formed
during the trajectory transformation at time moments when the window of
reality passes through them and the result depends on the “initial” details
of the system trajectory {x(t, T )} in the region t > T . In this case it is not
possible to speak about universal laws governing the system dynamics in the
standard interpretation. Nevertheless there a special case when it becomes
possible.
According to equation (1) the change of the system trajectory {x(t, T )}
is characterized by two temporal scales. The first one is the thickness of
bold instants, , specifying the duration of the time interval within which
a given point of the system trajectory is in present. The second one is the
time scale τ characterizing the rate of the conversion of forthcoming future
into the nearest past within the current bold instant tT , i.e., the strength of
the operator Ω̂ [{x(t, T )}]. When the ration
τ

 1 or, moreover, is itself infinitesimal, (4)
the system trajectory gets equilibrium configuration (if it is stable) actually
within the bold instant tT which is described by the condition
Ω̂ [{x(t)}] = 0 , (5)
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where the steady-state trajectory {x(t)} does not depend on meta-time T .
In this case the system past is mainly determined by equality (5) and
“forgets” completely the “initial” future of the system. As a result the laws
describing the newly emerged past as the present may be of a universal
form reflecting only the physics of a given system. Figure 4 illustrates this
situation.
4 Steady-state laws of system dynamics
I will call condition (4) the limit of steady-state laws and will assume it to
hold in our reality. In this case the system dynamics described in terms of
the position x(t) in the space RN occupied by the system in the immediate
past obeys the equation
ω
[
x(t),
dx(t)
dt
,
d2x(t)
dt2
,
d3x(t)
dt3
, . . .
]
= 0 (6)
by virtue of (3).
Expression (6) is the key point determining further constructions in the
present paper. In particular, it explains why the laws governing the dynam-
ics of systems in the framework of classical physics admits a representation
in the form of some formulas joining together the time derivatives of the
motion trajectory taken at the current moment of time. Thereby the for-
malism of differential equations is actually the native language of physics
or, speaking more strictly, Newtonian mechanics. Naturally the question on
whether differential equations are the very basic formalism of physics has
been in the focus of long-term debates and attacked from various points of
view, for a short review see, e.g., Sto¨ltzner (2006) and references therein.
Causal relations can be also attributed to law (6), at least, when the
list of arguments of the function ω(. . .) is finite. In this case resolving equa-
tion (6) with respect to the highest order m time derivative of x(t) we obtain
the expression
dmx
dtm
= Φ
(
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
)
(7)
which admits interpretation as a causal relationship between the lower order
time derivatives
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
(8)
playing the role of causes and the highest time derivative dmx/dtm being
their effect. Indeed, when the system trajectory undergoes sharp variations
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inside the bold instant tT the highest derivative demonstrates changes most
drastically and it is possible to say that the collection of quantities (8) finally
cause the highest derivative to take value (7).
The accepted hypothesis on the finite number of arguments in the func-
tion ω(. . .) can be directly justified if the field of hyperreal numbers is ex-
tended to a ring including nilpotent infinitesimals. Nilpotents are nonzero
infinitely small numbers that yield zero when being multiplied by themselves
for a certain number of times. So if the kernels Ki(. . .) contain nilpotent
cofactors, the meta-time sensitivity operator Ω̂[{x(t, T )}] can comprise only
finite order power terms with respect to quantities similar to (2). In a sim-
ilar way Reeder (2015) uses nilpotents for constructing a novel solution to
Zeno’s arrow.
5 Variational formulation of steady-state dynam-
ics
There is a special case worthy of individual attention that admits the intro-
duction of a certain functional
L[{x(t, T )}]
to be call action following the traditions accepted in physics. This functional
specifies the operator of meta-time sensitivity as its functional derivative
Ω̂[{x(t, T )}] = −δS[{x(t, T )}]
δx(t, T )
. (9)
Because bold instants can couple only infinitely close time moments the
action functional in the general form can be written as
L[{x(t, T )}] =
+∞∫
−∞
dtL
[
x(t, T ),
∂x(t, T )
∂t
,
∂2x(t, T )
∂t2
,
∂3x(t, T )
∂t3
, . . .
]
, (10)
where function
L
[
x(t, T ),
∂x(t, T )
∂t
,
∂2x(t, T )
∂t2
,
∂3x(t, T )
∂t3
, . . .
]
(11)
is called the Lagrangian of a given system.
In the limit of stead-state laws the trajectory {x(t)} meeting condi-
tion (5) should be stable with respect to small (infinitesimal) variations
x(t, T ) = x(t) + δx(t, T ) .
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It means that the variations δx(t, T ) have to fade as meta-time T grows. This
stability condition directly gives rise to the following requirement which has
to be imposed on the corresponding form of the action functional and its
Lagrangian.
Principle of Least Actions: Let a physical system admit the introduction of the
action functional (10) describing its dynamics in meta-time. Then its steady-state
trajectory {x(t)} describing the system motion in the past including the immedi-
ate past matches the minimal value of the action functional among all the other
possible trajectories
x(t) =⇒ min
+∞∫
−∞
dtL
[
x(t),
dx(t)
dt
,
d2x(t)
dt2
,
d3x(t)
dt3
, . . .
]
. (12)
Actually this principle is in one-to-one correspondence with the principle
of least actions well-known in physics provided the Lagrangian L(x, dx/dt)
depends only on the system position x and the velocity dx/dt.
6 Notion of phase space
In the previous sections we have considered the general description of system
dynamics in the framework of thick presentism and the limit of steady-state
laws has been assumed to hold in our world. In this case the dynamics of a
physical system conceived of as the motion of a point x in a certain space
is governed by equation (6) joining together all the time derivatives of the
trajectory x(t) taken at the current moment of time t.
In what follows, first, we will confine ourselves to the case where the
number of the time derivatives entering the right-hand side of (6) is finite
for any physical object. Second, we will consider an ensemble of structureless
particles whose individual motion can be represented as the motion of a point
xα in the space RN ; in our world N = 3. This ensemble may be described as
a point x = {xα} of the space RNM , where M is the number of particles in
the given ensemble. Besides, for the sake of simplicity we will assume that
for all the particles only the first (m− 1) derivatives of their coordinates xα
enter equation (6).3
3The further constructions can be easily generalized to the case when the state of differ-
ent particles is characterized by different parameters mα, which, however, over-complicates
the mathematical expressions without any reason required for understanding the subject.
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Under these conditions equation (6) treated as some equality can be re-
served with respect to the highest derivative dmx/dtm which gives us expres-
sion (7). This expression may be interpreted as a causal type relationship
between the time derivatives of order less than m (including the zero-th or-
der derivative just being the particle positions) and the derivative dmx/dtm.
For individual particles formula (7) takes the form
dmxα
dtm
= Φα
(
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
)
, (13)
where the particle index α is omitted at the list of arguments in the right-
hand side of (13), which denotes that all the particles of a given ensemble
should be counted here because of the particle interaction.
The fact that the right-hand side of equation (13) contains only the
time derivatives of order less than m does not mean the mutual indepen-
dence of these quantities. There could be conceived of some additional con-
strains imposed on this system such that one of these derivatives, mainly,
dm−1x/dtm−1 is completely determined by the others. It actually reduces
the number of arguments in (13). Therefore below we may assume the
collection of quantities
{Q}α =
{
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
}
α
, (14)
to be mutually independent for all the particles {α}. It means that for
arbitrary chosen values there can be found an instantiation of this system
such that during its motion these time derivatives take the given values at
a given moment of time t.
Now we can introduce the notion of the phase space
P =
{
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
}
(15)
for the system at hand regarded as a whole. If we know the position of the
system in the space P treated as a point θ with the coordinates
θ =
(
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
)
, (16)
then the rate of the system motion in the phase space P is completely de-
termined via relationship (13). Solving this equation we can construct the
trajectory of the system motion. The aforesaid is illustrated in Fig. 5.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the phase space introduction starting from the
principle of microlevel reducibility in the framework of thick presentism.
The phase space is one of the basic elements in describing such objects.
In particular, specifying the system position in the phase space P = {θ} we
actually can calculate the velocity of the system motion in it. Indeed, the
time derivatives entering the complete collection of mutually independent
components for all the particles{{
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
}
α
}
may be treated as independent phase variables
ϕα,p
def
=
dxp−1α
dtp−1
, for p = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
in particular, the variable ϕα,1 = xα just represents the spacial coordinates
of the particle α, ϕα,2 = vα is the velocity of its motion in the physical
space, and ϕα,3 = aα is its acceleration in it. The mutual independence of
these variables is understood in the sense explained above; it is the principle
possibility of finding a real instantiation of the system in issue at the state
such that at a given moment of time all these derivatives take the corre-
sponding values chosen arbitrary. Then the system dynamics governed by
equation (13) may be represented as
dϕα,p
dt
= ϕα,p+1 for p = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 and
dϕα,m
dt
= Φα (ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕm) . (17a)
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Here, as previously, omitting the index α at the arguments of the function
Φα{. . .} denotes that its list of arguments should contain the phase variables
{ϕα,p} of all the particles. These differential equations which symbolically
may be written as
dθ
dt
= Φ(θ) (17b)
determine all the laws of the system dynamics.
The existence of equations (17) endows the inanimate world in the realm
of classic physic with a fundamental property described by two notions re-
flecting its different aspects. One of them is the notion of initial conditions.4
Namely, if we know the system position θ0 in the phase space P at an ar-
bitrary chosen moment of time t0 then, generally speaking, equations (17)
possess the unique solution for t > t0
θ = θ(t, θ0) such that at t = t0 θ(t0, θ0) = θ0 . (18)
In other words, if the “forces” Φ(θ) and the initial system position θ0 are
known, then the system dynamics can be calculated, at least, in principle.
It means that inanimate systems have no memory; if we know what is going
on with such a system at a given moment of time, then its “history” does
not matter, which was claimed previously appealing to Premise 1.
The other one is the notion of the determinism of physical systems; if
we repeat the system motion under the same conditions with respect to the
initial position θ0 and the “forces” Φ(θ) acting on the system, then the same
trajectory of system motion will be reproduced. Drawing this conclusion we
actually have assumed implicitly that the “forces” Φ(θ) do not depend on
the time t. If it is not so, then we can expand the system to include external
objects causing the time dependence of these “forces.” The feasibility of
such an extension is justified by the principle of microlevel reducibility. In
fact it claims that at the microslevel describing completely a given system
there are only structureless constituent particles and the interaction between
them. So there no factors that can cause the time dependence of the “forces”
Φ(θ) and, in particular, endow them with random properties.
Brief digression: It should be noted that this determinism does not exclude highly
complex dynamics of nonlinear physical systems manifesting itself in phenomena
usually referred to as dynamical chaos. Dynamical chaos can be observed when the
motion of a system in its phase space is confined to a certain bounded domain and
the motion trajectories are unstable with respect to small perturbations. This insta-
bility means that two trajectories of such a system initially going in close proximity
4Actually the range of applicability of notion of initial conditions is much wider than
Newtonian mechanics, which however is beyond the scope of our discussion.
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to each other diverge substantially as time goes on, and, finally, the initial proximity
of the two trajectories becomes unrecognizable. These effects make the dynamics of
such systems practically unpredictable. For example, in numerical solution of equa-
tions (17) the discretization of continuous functions and round-off errors play the role
of disturbing factors responsible for a significant dependence of the found solutions
on the selected time step in discretization and particular details of arithmetic oper-
ations at a used computer. In studying systems with dynamical chaos in laboratory
experiments the presence of weak uncontrollable factors is also inevitable. Moreover,
there is a reason arguing for the fact that the notion of dynamical chaos is a funda-
mental problem rather than a particular question about practical implementations of
system dynamics. The determinism of physical systems implies the reproducibility
of their motion trajectories provided the same initial conditions are reproduced each
time. However, in trying to control extremely small variations in the system phase
variables we can face up to effects lying beyond the range of applicability of classical
physic. So in studding various instantiations of one system it can be necessary to
assume that each time the initial conditions are not set equal but distributed randomly
inside a certain, maybe, very small domain. So determinism and dynamical chaos
are not contradictory but complementary concepts reflecting different aspects of the
dynamics of physical systems in the realm of classical physics.
7 Energy conservation and Newton’s second law
Appealing to the concepts of thick presentism it is not possible to find out
the order m − 1 of the derivative dm−1x/dtm−1 that determines how many
components collection (14) contains, i.e. to specify the structure of the phase
space P (15). From physics we know that m = 2, i.e., for any ensemble of
classical particles the phase space consists of the spatial coordinates and
velocities of the particles making up it. Let us try to elucidate whether this
type phase space endows the corresponding systems with unique properties
via which such systems stand out against the other objects.
In the simplest case, i.e., when the value m = 1, the phase space con-
tains only the spatial positions of particles P1 = {x}. In this instance the
respective systems tend to go directly to spacial “stationary” points xeq such
that
dxα
dt
= Φα,1 (xeq) = 0 for all α,
if, naturally, they are stable. This class of models, broadly speaking, is
the heart of Aristotelian physics assuming, in particular, that for a body
to move some force should act on it. There are many examples of real
physical objects exhibiting complex behaviour that are effectively described
using the notions inherited from Aristotelian physic. The complexity of
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their dynamics is due to the fact that all their stationary points turn out to
be unstable and, instead, some complex attractors, i.e., multitudes toward
which systems tend to evolve, arise in the phase space P1. Nevertheless, if
our inanimate world were governed solely by Aristotelian physics it would
be rather poor in properties. For example, if the motion of planets of a solar
system obeyed such laws then they would drop to its sun and the galaxies
could not form.
The next case with respect to the simplicity of phase spaces matches
m = 2. It is our world; the phase space of physical particles, at least, within
Newtonian mechanics consists of their spatial coordinates and velocities,
P2 =
{
x, v =
dx
dt
}
, (19)
which together determine the next order time derivative, the particle accel-
eration,
aα =
d2xα
dt2
= Φα,2 (x, v) . (20)
In other words, in Newtonian physics for a body to accelerate some forces
should act on it, whereas in Aristotelian physics for a body to move some
forces should act on it. The systems whose dynamics is described by the
phase space P2 possess two distinctive features.
One of them, usually called the dynamics reversibility, is exhibited by
systems where the regular “force” Φα,2 (x) depends only on the particle
positions {x}. In this case the governing equation (20) is symmetrical with
respect to changing the time flow direction, i.e. the replacement t → −t.
This symmetry is responsible for the fact that if at the end of motion the
velocities of all the particles are inverted, vα → −vα, then they should move
back along the same trajectories.
The other one is the possibility of introducing the notion of energy for
the real physical systems. At the microlevel the energy, comprising the
components of the kinetic and potential energy, is a certain function
H(x, v) (21)
whose value does not change during the system motion. Namely, if x(t) is a
trajectory of system motion then the formal function on t
H(t)
def
= H
[
x(t), v(t) =
dx(t)
dt
]
(22)
in fact does not depend on the time t. Such systems are called conserva-
tive. The existence of the energy H(x, v) does not necessary stem from the
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governing equation (20) but is actually an additional assumption about the
basic properties of physical systems at the microlevel. Naturally, it imposes
some conditions on the possible forms of the function Φα,2(x, v).
The two features endow physical systems with rich properties and com-
plex behavior. For example, although in a solar system the planets are
attracted by the sun, they do not drop on it because when a planet comes
closer to the sun its kinetic energy grows, preventing the direct fall on the
sun. Naturally, this planet should not move initially along a straight line
passing exactly through the sun. The reversibility is responsible for this
planet to tend to return to the initial state or its analogy after passing the
point at the planet trajectory located at the shortest distance to the sun.
Broadly speaking, the existence of energy endows physical objects with a
certain analogy of memory. Certainly, if the initial conditions for a given
system are known, its further dynamics is determined completely, at least,
in principle, so the previous system history does not matter. Nevertheless,
the conservative systems “do not forget” their initial states in the meaning
that the motion trajectories matching different values of the energy cannot
be mixed.5
Summarizing this discussion about the systems with the phase space
P2 we may claim that it is the simplest situation when the corresponding
physical world is reach in properties.
As far as systems with a phase space containing time derivatives of higher
orders are concerned, they seem not to admit the introduction of the energy
at all in a self-consistent way. In order to explain this fact we reproduce the
construction of the governing equations for such systems of particles using
Lagrangian formulation of Newtonian mechanics based on the principle of
least actions. It is worthy of noting that in some sense Lagrangian formu-
lation of mechanics is more general than its formulation directly appealing
to Newton’s laws. Indeed in the latter case the existence of energy is an
additional assumption imposing certain conditions on the forces with which
physical particles interact with one another. In Lagrangian formulation the
5First, it should be noted that a many-particle ensemble can exhibit so complex dy-
namics that it could be impossible to track its motion from a given initial state within
physically achievable accuracy. In this case it possible to speak about the effective for-
getting of the initial conditions. The latter also concerns extremely weak perturbations.
Second, there are systems with highly complex dynamics whose description does not ad-
mit any energy conservation and their motion is irreversible; the term dynamical chaos
noted before is usually used to refer to these phenomena. Nevertheless it does not con-
tradict to the present argumentation because the corresponding irreversible description
is obtained via the reduction of equation (20) and assuming the presence of a certain
external environment weakly interacting with a system at hand.
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existence of some function, the Lagrangian L, reduced then to the system
energy is the pivot point and the derived equation governing the system
dynamics originally contain the forces meeting the required conditions.
As the general case, let us consider a system with the phase space
Pm = {θm} =
{
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
}
,
where m is a certain number not necessary equal to 2. The pivot point
of Lagrangian formalism is the introduction of a certain functional L{x(t)}
determined for any arbitrary trajectory {x(t)}t=tet=ts starting and ending at
some time moments t = ts and t = te, respectively. The notion of functional
means that for any given trajectory {x(t)} we can calculate a certain number
L{x(t)} which is treated as a measure of its “quality” in the realm of the
Lagrangian mechanics. Since the systems at hand do not possess memory
and cannot predict their future, all their significant characteristics including
the “quality” of motion have to be determined by the local properties of
the trajectory {x(t)}. In the given case, it is the collection θn of the phase
variables x, dx/dt, . . . , dm−1x/dtm−1. Therefore the functional L{x(t)} has
to be of the integral form
L{x(t)} =
te∫
ts
L
(
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
dm−1x
dtm−1
)
dt , (23)
where L(. . .) is some function of these n phase variables. The principle
of least actions implies that “the Nature chooses the best trajectories to
implement” the dynamics of mechanical systems. In other words, a real
trajectory of system motion matches the minimum of functional (23) (or
its maximum within the replacement L → −L) with respect to all possible
variations near this real trajectory (Fig. 6).
It is worthy of noting that in spite of its long-term history the funda-
mentality of the principle of least actions is up to now a challenging problem
and there are a number of arguments for and against it from various points
of view. Their brief review can be found, e.g., in Sto¨ltzner (2006) as well as
a detailed analysis of its ontological roots has be given by Sto¨ltzner (2003,
2009); Katzav (2004); Smart and The´bault (2015); Terekhovich (2015). Nev-
ertheless its high efficient in many different branches of physics strongly ar-
gues for its real fundamentality. In Section 5 I have demonstrated that this
principle can be derived based on the concepts of thick presentism for sys-
tems whose phase space contains hight order time derivatives as individual
phase variables.
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Figure 6: Illustration of the principle
of least actions describing the mini-
mality of the functional L{x(t)} (23)
taken at the real trajectory {x(t)}
with respect to its variations.
In the case of Newtonian mechanics, i.e., for systems with the phase
space P2 the principle of least actions leads to the governing equations of
type (17) admitting the introduction of the energy given by the expression
H(x, v) = v∂L(x, v)
∂v
− L(x, v) . (24)
In the general case (for m > 2) it is also possible to construct some function
having properties similar to that of energy,6 however we meet the following
challenging problem.
Let {x(t)} be a motion trajectory at which functional (23) attains its
minimum (or maximum). Then for all small perturbations x(t) + δx(t) of
this trajectory similar to one shown in Fig. 6 the variation δL = L{x(t) +
δx(t)} − L{x(t)} of this functional has to be equal to zero in the linear
approximation in δx(t). It reads
δL =
te∫
ts
{
∂L
∂x
· δx(t) + ∂L
∂x(1)
· δ
[
dx(t)
dt
]
+
∂L
∂x(2)
· δ
[
dx2(t)
dt2
]
+ . . .
+
∂L
∂x(m−1)
· δ
[
dxm−1(t)
dtm−1
]}
dt = 0 , (25)
where the symbol x(p) (with p = 1, 2, . . .m − 1) denotes the corresponding
time derivative, x(p) = dpx(t)/dtp, treated as the argument of the function
L(x, x(1), x(2), . . . , x(m−1)). Using the identities
δ
[
dxp(t)
dtp
]
=
dp[δx(t)]
dtp
=
d
dt
[
dp−1[δx(t)]
dtp−1
]
(in the latter case p > 1),
6An example of how to construct an “energy,” i.e., Hamiltonian for systems with the
phase space P3 = {x, v, a} has been demonstrated, e.g., by Lubashevsky et al. (2003).
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the rule of integration by parts
te∫
ts
U(t)
dV (t)
dt
dt =
[
U(t)V (t)
]t=te
t=ts
−
te∫
ts
V (t)
dU(t)
dt
dt ,
and choosing the trajectory perturbations δx(t) such that (it is our right)
δx(t)|t=ts,tp = 0 ,
dp[δx(t)]
dtp
∣∣∣∣
t=ts,tp
= 0 (for p = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1)
equality (25) is reduced to
δL =
te∫
ts
{
∂L
∂x
− d
dt
∂L
∂x(1)
+
(
d
dt
)2 ∂L
∂x(2)
− . . .
+ (−1)m−1
(
d
dt
)m−1 ∂L
∂x(m−1)
}
δx(t) dt = 0 . (26)
Because equality (26) must hold for any particular perturbation of the tra-
jectory {x(t)} this trajectory has to obey the equation
∂L
∂x
− d
dt
∂L
∂x(1)
+
(
d
dt
)2 ∂L
∂x(2)
− . . .+(−1)m−1
(
d
dt
)m−1 ∂L
∂x(m−1)
= 0 . (27)
The time derivative of the highest order contained in equation (27) is
d2(m−1)x/dt2(m−1) ;
it enters this equation via the last term as the item
(−1)m−1 ∂
2L
∂[x(m−1)]2
· d
2(m−1)x
dt2(m−1)
.
When the derivative ∂2L/∂[x(m−1)]2 is not equal to zero,7 i.e., the Lagran-
gian L(. . .) is not a linear function with respect to its argument dm−1x/dtm−1,
equation (27) can be directly resolved with respect to the derivative
d2(m−1)x
dt2(m−1)
7In the case of Newtonian mechanics with the phase space P2 the corresponding term
is just the mass m of a given particle, ∂2L/∂[x(2)]2 = m.
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and rewritten as
d2(m−1)x
dt2(m−1)
= Φ∗
(
x,
dx
dt
,
d2x
dt2
, . . . ,
d2m−3x
dt2m−3
)
, (28)
where Φ∗(. . .) is a certain function. Equation (28) governs the dynamics of
the system in issue and can be regarded as its basic law written in the form
of differential equation.8
When the number of the phase variables forming the phase space Pm is
larger than two, m > 2, the obtained governing equation (28) comes in con-
flict with the initial assumption about the properties of the given physical
system. The matter is that the number of the arguments of the function
Φ∗(. . .) exceeds the dimension of the phase space Pm because 2(m− 1) > m
for m > 2. Thereby we cannot treat equation (28) as a law governing the de-
terministic motion of a certain dynamical system in the phase space Pm. In-
deed, to do this we need that the point θm = {x, dx/dt, . . . , dm−1x/dtm−1}
of the phase space Pm determine completely the rate of the system motion
in it, in other words, the corresponding governing equation should be of
form dθm/dt = Φ(θm) (see equation (17)). However, the obtained equa-
tion (28) stemming from the principle of least actions contradicts this re-
quirement because its right hand side contains the time derivatives higher
than d(m−1)x/dt(m−1) for m > 2. Therefore in order to construct a solu-
tion of equation (28) dealing with only the phase space Pm we need some
additional information about, for example, the terminal point of the ana-
lyzed trajectory. The latter feature, however, contradicts the principle of
microlevel reducibility because according this principle the current state of
such a system should determine its further motion completely.
Summarizing this discussion we see that only in the case of m = 2
equation (28) following from the principle of least actions for trajectories in
the phase space Pm admits the interpretation in terms of a certain dynamical
system whose motion is completely specified within this phase space. If
m = 1 the minimality of functional (23) does not describe any dynamics.
Therefore, it is likely that the notion of the energy H(x, v) can be introduced
8Lagrangian mechanics with higher order time derivatives is well known and was de-
veloped during the middle of the XIX century by Ostrogradski (1850). So here I have
presented the results in a rather symbolic form emphasizing the features essential for our
consideration. Mechanics dealing with equation (28) with m > 2 as one describing some
initial value problem faces up to the Ostrogradsky instability (see, e.g., Woodard, 2007;
Stephen, 2008; Smilga, 2009), which can be used for explaining why no differential equa-
tions of higher order than two appear to describe physical phenomena (Motohashi and
Suyama, 2015). There are also arguments for the latter conclusion appealing to meta-
physical aspects of time changes in physical quantities (Easwaran, 2014).
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in a self-consistent way only for systems with the phase space P2 = {x, v}
where the governing laws can be written as differential equations of the
second order.
8 Conclusion
In the given paper I have presented arguments for the relationship between
the notions and formalism used in the basic laws of classical physics and
the existence of the microlevel of description of the corresponding physical
systems which obeys the principle of microlevel reducibility.
According to this principle, first, any system belonging to the realm of
classical physics admits the representation as an ensemble of structureless
particles with certain properties ascribed to them individually. Second, the
interaction between these particles is supposed to be determined completely
by their individual properties and to meet the superposition principle. In the
given case the superposition principle is reduced either to (i) the model of
long-distant pair-wise interaction between particles or (ii) the model of local
interaction between particles and some fields with linear properties. Within
the former model the dynamics of any system is determined completely by
the current values taken by the individual properties of its particles. Within
the latter model this statement also holds provided the particle properties
instantiated withing some time interval are taken into account.
Whence I have drawn the following conclusions, where, for short, the
particle long-distant interaction is implied to be the case if a specific model
of particle interaction is not noted explicitly.
• Laws governing the dynamics of such systems can be written within the
formalism of ordinary differential equations dealing with time deriva-
tives of the particle’s individual properties. It has been justified (i)
appealing to the concepts of thick presentism regarding the flow of
time as a sequence of bold instants and (ii) introducing two dimen-
sional time—the physical time and the meta-time.
• There is a limit in the two-dimensional time dynamics called the limit
of steady-state laws that admits the introduction of governing laws
describing the system motion in the form of differential equations re-
lating the time derivatives of order less than a certain integer m to the
time derivative of order m. Moreover in this case it is possible to in-
troduce the notion of Lagrangian—a function depending on the time
derivatives of order less than m. Its integral over a trial trajectory
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takes the minimum at the real trajectory, which justifies the principle
of least actions well known in physics.
• Dynamics of such systems can be described as their motion in the
corresponding phase space Pm. A point of this phase space admits
interpretation as a collection of all time derivatives of the particles’
individual properties whose order is less than a certain integer m;
naturally, this collection includes these properties too. The position
of a given system in its phase space Pm determines the rate of system
motion in this phase space, which enables us to introduce the notion of
initial conditions and the concept of determinism of physical systems.
• The energy conservation should be a consequence of some general laws
governing various systems of a given type rather than particular cir-
cumstances. Within this requirement, for a system to admit the in-
troduction of energy, its phase space P2 must comprise only the in-
dividual properties of the constituent particles and the corresponding
time derivatives of the fist order. The dynamics of such systems is
described by differential equations of the second order with respect to
time derivatives, which is exactly the case of Newtonian mechanics.
In these sense the systems belonging to the realm of classical physics
take the unique position among the other plausible models.
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